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According to the principle of Conjunction Closure, if one has justification for believing each of a set of 
propositions, one has justification for believing their conjunction.  The lottery and preface paradoxes 
can both be seen as posing challenges for Closure, but leave open familiar strategies for preserving 
the principle.  While this is all relatively well-trodden ground, a new Closure-challenging paradox has 
recently emerged, in two somewhat different forms, due to Marvin Backes (2019a) and Francesco 
Praolini (2019).  This paradox synthesises elements of the lottery and the preface and is designed to 
close off the familiar Closure-preserving strategies.  By appealing to a normic theory of justification, I 
will defend Closure in the face of this new paradox.  Along the way I will draw more general conclusions 
about justification, normalcy and defeat, which bear upon what Backes (2019b) has dubbed the ‘easy 
defeat’ problem for the normic theory. 
 
I BACKGROUND: THE LOTTERY AND PREFACE PARADOXES 
Consider the following principle: 
If one has justification for believing each of P1, P2, …, Pn, then one has justification for believing 
P1  P2  …  Pn.   
According to this principle, the set of propositions that one has justification for believing is closed 
under the operation of taking conjunctions – we might call it Conjunction Closure or, simply, Closure.  
In one way, the principle seems difficult to deny.  Suppose I endeavour to believe all and only those 
propositions for which I have justification.  If Closure fails, there will be possible situations in which I 
ought to believe each of a series of propositions while refraining from believing their conjunction.  
And yet, it’s unclear how I would actually go about following such a recommendation, even if I 
accepted it.  It’s unclear that there is any psychological difference between believing P1, believing P2, 
… believing Pn and believing P1  P2  …  Pn (see Evnine, 1999, section 7, Douven, 2002, pp395).  If a 
person has expressed belief in P1, and in P2, … and in Pn we would, without a second thought, describe 
the person as believing P1  P2  …  Pn.   
Suppose I’m filling in a large truth table.  If I put a ‘T’ in the P1 column and a ‘T’ in the P2 
column … and a ‘T’ in the Pn column, you would describe me as believing P1  P2  …  Pn.  Even if I 
hesitated when it came to the final P1  P2  …  Pn column, this wouldn’t obviously make any 
difference – it would merely look as though I don’t know how to complete a truth table for ‘’.  One 
might claim that it is, at least, possible to assert each of a series of propositions without asserting 
their conjunction.  But even this is unclear.  If I assert, in sequence, P1, P2, … Pn it would be natural for 
you to describe me as having asserted P1  P2  …  Pn.  One could insist that, in order to count as 
asserting the latter, I must literally voice the ‘and’s – but our ordinary practice of reporting assertions 
doesn’t appear to support any such requirement.  
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 These kinds of points have I think been somewhat neglected in discussions of Closure1 – but 
I won’t attempt to expand upon them here.  What discussions of Closure have tended to focus on 
are certain problems that the principle appears to generate.  Suppose I hold a single ticket – ticket 
#72 – in a fair 100-ticket lottery with a single winner.  Suppose I know that the lottery has been drawn 
and I’m yet to hear the result, but I already believe that ticket #72 has lost on the grounds that there 
are 99 losing tickets and only one winner.  It’s plausible that I have justification for believing this – 
given my evidence, it is highly likely to be true.  But if I have justification for believing (P72) that ticket 
#72 has lost, I must also have justification for believing (P1) that ticket #1 has lost, and for believing 
(P2) that ticket #2 has lost, and so on up to P100.  After all, my evidence for each of these propositions 
is exactly the same.  By stipulation, I know that one of the tickets has won, in which case I also have 
justification for believing ~P1  ~P2  …  ~P100.  If Closure holds, I must have justification for believing 
an outright contradiction – P1  P2  …  P100  (~P1  ~P2  …  ~P100).   
 This is a version of the lottery paradox (Kyburg, 1961).  The only way to preserve Closure, 
in the face of this paradox, is to insist that I lack justification for believing some of P1, P2 … P100.  
Since I have the same evidence for each of these propositions, given a suitable assumption to the 
effect that justification is a function of evidence, it will follow that I lack justification for believing 
each of P1, P2 … P1002.  Perhaps the fact that there is one winning ticket and 99 losers gives me 
justification for believing, of any given ticket, that it is very likely to have lost, but does not give me 
justification for believing that it has lost. 
 Suppose I have written a book in which I make 100 logically independent factual claims P1, 
P2 … P100.  Suppose each claim has been meticulously checked and it is stipulated that I’ve secured 
justification for believing each one.  I’m well aware however that I’m fallible and that comparably 
ambitious books have always turned out to contain falsehoods in the past.  As a result, I feel 
compelled to write in the preface that there are bound to be some falsehoods in the book.  Plausibly 
I have justification for believing this – given my evidence, it’s highly likely to be true.  But if I have 
justification for believing ~P1  ~P2  …  ~P100 and Closure holds, I must have justification for 
believing an outright contradiction – P1  P2  …  P100  (~P1  ~P2  …  ~P100).   
 This is a version of the preface paradox (Makinson, 1965).  The only way to preserve 
Closure, in the face of this paradox, is to insist that I lack justification for believing ~P1  ~P2  …  
 
1 An exception is Evnine (1999).  One reason, perhaps, for this relative neglect is that the transition from the n 
propositions P1, P2, … Pn to the single proposition P1  P2  …  Pn would seem to involve an inference – an 
instance of Conjunction Introduction – and surely it should be possible, in principle, to hold back from drawing 
an inference.  Such a thought is too quick, however.  As some theorists have observed, the term ‘inference’ tends 
to be used in two rather different ways in philosophy (Burgess, 1981, pp103, Harman, 1986, pp3-4): Sometimes 
it is used to mean a kind of psychological process whereby one acquires new beliefs, and sometimes it is used 
to mean an ordered pair consisting of a sequence of premises and a conclusion (or perhaps multiple conclusions).  
But there is no guarantee whatsoever that an inference in the latter ‘logical’ sense will always correspond to an 
inference in the former ‘psychological’ sense. 
2 Some have proposed a view on which one can justifiably believe, of some lottery tickets, that they have lost, 
but one cannot justifiably believe this about too many of the tickets simultaneously (Harman, 1986, pp70-71, 
Kroedel, 2012, see also Douven, 2008).  This allows us to retain a certain closure principle on which, if one has 
justification for simultaneously believing P1 and believing P2 … and believing Pn, then one has justification for 
believing P1  P2  …  Pn.  The view has significant costs however – whether one is justified in believing, of a 
given lottery ticket, that it has lost will no longer be purely a function of the evidence on which the belief is 
based, but will depend upon how many similar beliefs one has already formed.  I won’t discuss this view here.  
One further criticism of this proposed solution to the lottery paradox is that it may not extend to the preface 
paradox (see Eder, 2015). 
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~P100.  Perhaps the fact that I’m fallible and that carefully checked claims occasionally turn out to 
be false gives me justification for believing that it is very likely that the book contains falsehoods, 
but does not give me justification for believing that the book does contain falsehoods.  Even if we 
pursue this route, however, the preface paradox has a sting in the tail; if Closure is correct then not 
only will I lack justification for believing that P1  P2  …  P100 is false, I will have justification for 
believing that P1  P2  …  P100 is true – justification for believing that the book is completely 
falsehood-free.  This is a serious cost, as many have rightly emphasised (Christensen, 2004, chap. 
3).  Whether accepting this is more costly than abandoning Closure is I think less clear – but a topic 
for another occasion. 
 These two familiar paradoxes are, in a way, opposite sides of the same coin.  In each case 
we have a logically inconsistent set of 101 propositions: {P1, P2, …, P100, (~P1  ~P2  …  ~P100)}.  In 
the lottery paradox, it is stipulated that I have justification for believing ~P1  ~P2  …  ~P100 
(justification for believing that some ticket has won) and it is assumed that I must have justification 
for believing each of P1, P2, … , P100 (justification for believing, of each ticket, that it has lost).  In the 
preface paradox, it is stipulated that I have justification for believing each of P1, P2, … , P100 
(justification for believing each claim in the book) and it is assumed that I must have justification 
for believing ~P1  ~P2  …  ~P100 (justification for believing that some of the claims in the book 
are false).  These stipulations should be acceptable to all non-sceptics, but the assumptions provide 
an avenue of response for the defenders of Closure.   
Put differently: In the lottery paradox, ~(P1  P2  …  P100) is meant to be certain, but the 
evidence that I have for believing each of P1, P2, …, P100 – the evidence that there is one winning 
ticket and 99 losers – leaves each of these propositions with a distinctive kind of uncertainty.  By 
denying that belief can be justified on the basis of such ‘purely statistical’ evidence one can avoid 
the paradox and preserve Closure (see, for instance, Ryan, 1996, Nelkin, 2000, Smith, 2010, 2016, 
section 3.1, Smithies, 2012).  In the preface paradox, it is effectively left open what kind of evidence 
I have for believing each of P1, P2, …, P100, allowing us to fill in the details as we see fit, but the 
evidence I have for believing (~P1  ~P2  …  ~P100) is fixed – it consists in the fact that I am fallible 
and that comparably ambitious books have always turned out to contain falsehoods.  By denying 
that belief can be justified on the basis of this ‘pessimistic inductive’ evidence, one can avoid the 
paradox and preserve Closure (see, for instance, Ryan, 1991, Kaplan, 2013, Kim, 2015, Smith, 2016, 
section 4.1). 
In each paradox, a substantial assumption about epistemic justification is needed – it isn’t 
possible to disprove Closure using stipulations alone.  Or is it?  In recent work, a new Closure-
challenging paradox has been set out, in somewhat different forms, by Marvin Backes (2019a) and 
Francesco Praolini (2019).  This paradox, which combines elements of the lottery and the preface, 
relies on no obvious assumptions about epistemic justification and appears to resist the familiar 
Closure-preserving strategies.   
 
II THE HYBRID PARADOX 
Following Praolini, suppose again that I have secured justification for believing each of 100 logically 
independent factual claims P1, P2 … P100 which I compile in a book.  Suppose I then send my book 
manuscript to the Perfectly Omniscient Press for consideration for publication, and am informed by 
their perfectly omniscient and truthful referee that there is one false claim in the book, providing me 
with justification for believing ~P1  ~P2  …  ~P100.  If Closure holds, I must have justification for 
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believing an outright contradiction – P1  P2  …  P100  (~P1  ~P2  …  ~P100).  As in the preface 
paradox, it is simply stipulated that I have justification for believing each of P1, P2 … P100 – my evidence 
in favour of these propositions is left unspecified and can be filled in as we wish.  As in the lottery 
paradox, it is simply stipulated that I have justification for believing ~P1  ~P2  …  ~P100 – this 
proposition is meant to be certain.  As a result, this ‘hybrid’ paradox does not appear to rely on any 
substantial assumptions3. 
 In fact, ~P1  ~P2  …  ~P100 doesn’t quite exhaust the content of the referee’s report, as 
Praolini describes it.  In Praolini’s example, the referee reveals not just that there is at least one 
falsehood in the book, but that there is exactly one falsehood in the book – which entails, but is not 
entailed by, ~P1  ~P2  …  ~P100.  The extra content of the report could be captured by making this 
an exclusive rather than an inclusive disjunction4.  The extra content, however, is inessential to the 
paradox, and makes no difference for what follows – with one possible exception which I will note. 
 As Praolini points out, when I receive the report from the perfectly omniscient referee, one 
might think that this serves to defeat my justification for believing the claims in the book.  In this case, 
when I acquire justification for believing ~P1  ~P2  …  ~P100, I would lose justification for believing 
P1, P2 … P100 and there would be no single time at which I have justification for believing all 101 
propositions.  While this is one possible way of blocking the paradox, according to Praolini it is 
implausible to think that the referee’s report would defeat my justification for everything that I’ve 
written in the book.  Rather than imagining a book with a mere 100 claims, Praolini considers a book 
which contains ‘all and only logically independent propositions that you are justified to believe’ 
(Praolini, 2019, pp720).  For any set of propositions, there may be many subsets with mutually logically 
independent members, and none of these need be maximal – but suppose we imagine a book detailing 
some suitably large set of logically independent propositions that I believe.  Now the stakes are even 
higher.  Defeating all of the claims in the book would be tantamount to defeating my justified beliefs 
en masse – and surely the referee’s report would not have this effect.   
Backes (2019a) describes a case that is structurally similar:  Suppose I am slipped a pill that 
ensures that some small proportion of the justified beliefs that I form, during a certain period, will be 
false.  When the period has elapsed, I learn of the pill and its effects, putting me in much the same 
situation as in Praolini’s example.  Backes is also aware that Closure could be saved if the information 
 
3 There are some anticipations of this paradox in earlier literature.  For instance, the paradox bears a relation to 
Ryan’s ‘third version’ of the preface paradox (Ryan, 1991, pp304) in which one receives a defeasible report to 
the effect that one’s book contains a falsehood.  She concludes that, if one has genuinely secured justification 
for believing each claim in the book, then one would not be justified in believing the report and should simply 
dismiss it.  This closure-preserving strategy is not available in Praolini’s case.  In the ‘homogeneous preface 
paradox’ described by Easwaran and Fitelson (2015, section 3) one writes a well-researched ambitious factual 
book arguing precisely that all well-researched ambitious factual books contain at least one error.  In this case, 
Easwaran and Fitelson suggest that one has something much stronger than the usual ‘pessimistic inductive’ 
evidence to the effect that one’s book contains an error – which, if correct, would give the paradox something 
like the same character as Praolini’s.  In fact, I think it’s far from clear that this suggestion is correct – something 
I will return to in n9. 
4 If we simply replace the ‘’s with binary ‘exclusive-or’s then this won’t give us the desired content (no matter 
where we add brackets).  We could instead make use of an n-place exclusive-or function which returns the value 
true iff exactly one of its arguments is true.  Thanks to Jim Pryor here. 
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about the pill is taken to defeat all of the justified beliefs that I formed during this period – but he too 
regards it as implausible that this information could have such a devastating defeating effect5. 
For Backes, the lesson of this paradox is that Closure fails.  For Praolini, the lesson of the 
paradox is that either Closure fails or justification is factive – one can only have justification for 
believing true propositions (see for instance Sutton, 2007, Littlejohn, 2012, Williamson, forthcoming).  
As Praolini points out, if justification were factive, then the very set-up of the paradox would be 
impossible.  If I had justification for believing each of P1, P2 … P100, and justification were factive, then 
the omniscient, truthful referee couldn’t inform me of ~P1  ~P2  …  ~P100 – for this would be false.   
In the next section, I will set out a rather different response to the paradox – one that revives 
the idea that the referee’s report may function as a kind of defeater.  The first thing to observe is that, 
in order to block the paradox, it is not necessary that the report defeat all of the claims in the book – 
it is enough that it defeat some.  Since the report is so general, and fails to single out any individual 
claims, the idea that it would serve to defeat some claims and not others may look like a nonstarter.  
I will argue that this idea is more promising than it first appears. 
    
III THE PRINCIPLE OF DIFFERENTIAL DEFEAT 
Suppose I’ve been invited to a drinks reception, and I know that a very eminent, world-leading 
primatologist will be in attendance.  In preparation for the event, I arm myself with three ‘primate 
facts’ that I can causally drop into the conversion in case the primatologist and I are introduced.  First, 
I read in the current edition of Encyclopedia Brittanica that bonobos are capable of passing the mirror 
self-recognition test (P1).  Second, I read in a newspaper article that Madagascar was once home to 
lemurs that were larger than humans (P2).  Finally, a few days before the reception, I hear in 
conversation that the barbary macaque is the only species of old world monkey that lacks a tail (P3).  I 
come to believe each of P1, P2 and P3 and, plausibly, I am justified in doing so.  At the reception I am 
introduced to the primatologist and, over-eager to impress, I blurt out all three ‘facts’ in quick 
succession.  The primatologist furrows her brow and says ‘I’m afraid something that you just said there 
is wrong’.  Before she can elaborate further, however, she is quickly whisked away to meet another 
guest.   
 How, at this point, should I revise my beliefs?  If I accept what the primatologists says, it’s 
clear that I can’t just continue to believe each of P1, P2 and P3 – that would be irrational.  One thing I 
could do is to give up all of these beliefs, and suspend judgment on P1, P2 and P3.  This may be a 
permissible response to my new evidence – but, in a way, it seems like an overreaction.  After all, my 
evidence for these three propositions is not equal – it’s natural to think that my justification for 
believing P1 is stronger than my justification for believing P2 which, in turn, is stronger than my 
 
5 Dutant and Littlejohn (2020, section 2) discuss two further examples which have the same structure as those 
described by Praolini and Backes.  First, imagine a person undergoing an eye test who is asked to identify various 
letters and numbers on a series of slides.  While she is able to answer all of the questions easily and forms a 
series of justified perceptual beliefs over the course of the test, she is subsequently told by the optometrist that 
she made one error.  Second, imagine a judge who has convicted many defendants over her career.  Suppose 
that, in each such case, there was strong incriminating evidence and she justifiably believed the defendant to be 
guilty.  Suppose she is then reliably informed that one of the people she has convicted is innocent.  Dutant and 
Littlejohn also consider, and dismiss, the possibility that the new evidence from the optometrist or the informant 
could defeat all of the beliefs that fall within its scope – all of the eye-test beliefs or guilt beliefs.  Though I will 
focus on Praolini’s example in the main text, I will have a bit more to say about these examples in n7 – and I 
hope to discuss them at length elsewhere. 
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justification for believing P3.  While the current edition of Encyclopedia Brittanica is a highly reliable 
source for information about primates, a newspaper is somewhat less reliable and a snippet of 
conversation is less reliable still.  Another permissible response to the new evidence, I suggest, is to 
retain my beliefs in P1 and P2 and to give up my belief in P3.  If this suggestion is right, then it is only 
my justification for P3 that is defeated by the primatologist’s remark – my justification for P1 and P2 
survives.   
Turning back to Praolini’s example, if we imagine a book containing most of the propositions 
that I justifiably believe, this will include claims such as ‘Two and two is four’ and ‘I am not a turnip’ 
through to claims such as ‘Edinburgh Waverly has the highest annual footfall of any train station in 
Scotland’ and ‘Oswald acted alone‘.  When I discover that the book contains a falsehood, it’s highly 
implausible that all of these claims suddenly become equally doubtful.  Rather, the claims that are 
made most doubtful by this discovery are the ones that were the most doubtful to begin with.   
Suppose one has justification for believing each proposition in a set {P1, P2, …, Pn}.  According 
to what I will call the Principle of Uniform Defeat, if one learns ~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn then this will defeat 
one’s justification for every proposition in {P1, P2, …, Pn}.  The Principle of Uniform Defeat does have 
an initial appeal and may be a consequence of principles that some philosophers have explicitly 
endorsed – such as Ryan’s ‘avoid falsity principle’ (Ryan, 1996)6.  I propose instead a Principle of 
Differential Defeat: If one learns ~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn then this will defeat one’s justification for all and 
only those propositions in {P1, P2, …, Pn} that were the least justified, prior to the discovery.   




P76, P12, P82 
P19, P71, P4, P96 
P50, P31 
P64, P39, P7, P90 
According to the Principle of Differential Defeat, when I learn ~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn this serves to defeat 
my justification for believing all and only those claims in the bottom tier.  In this case, when I receive 
the referee’s report, I lose justification for believing P64, P39, P7 and P90 and the paradox is blocked. 
The Principle of Differential Defeat offers a way of resolving the hybrid paradox without 
abandoning Closure or embracing the claim that justification is factive.  Praolini is aware of this 
potential solution to the paradox and offers four replies (see Praolini, 2019, pp722-723), which I will 
consider in turn.  First, Praolini suggests that, far from defeating some of the claims in the book, the 
referee’s report should actually increase my justification for each of the claims.  Recall that, in 
Praolini’s example, the referee informs me that there is exactly one falsehood in the book and no 
more – and, according to Praolini, this should come as good news.  To motivate this, he reiterates 
 
6 According to the Avoid Falsity Principle, for any competing set of statements L, if one has good reason to believe 
every member of L, and one also has good reason to believe that at least one member of L is false or is justified 
in suspending judgment about whether at least one member of L is false, then one is not epistemically justified 
in believing any of the members of L (Ryan, 1996, pp130).  Given Ryan’s definition of what it is for a set of 
statements L to be ‘competing’, this appears to be automatically satisfied in case one has good reason for 
believing that at least one member of L is false. 
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some reasoning that is familiar from the preface paradox; given that I’m fallible, and there are so many 
claims in the book, we should expect it to contain numerous falsehoods.  As a result, to discover that 
there is only one false claim in the book is to discover that things have turned out much better than 
expected, and the discovery should boost my justification for each individual claim.  As discussed 
above, this reasoning does have a certain appeal – but it is reasoning that a defender of Closure is 
already committed to rejecting.  If Closure holds then, prior to receiving the referee’s report, I have 
justification for believing that there are no false claims in the book.  As a result, there is at least one 
sense in which I should not ‘expect’ the book to contain numerous falsehoods, and in which the report 
does not represent better news than expected.  Praolini’s first reply should, then, leave a defender of 
Closure unmoved – it effectively takes it for granted that Closure fails. 
Second, Praolini suggests that, since the referee report fails to specify any particular claims, it 
is counterintuitive that it would defeat some claims and not others.  That is, it is counterintuitive that 
the referee report should defeat only P64, P39, P7 and P90 – even if these do happen to be the least 
justified in the book.  As noted above, there is something attractive about this suggestion, but it fails 
to stand up to scrutiny.  Even if a defeater weighs equally against each of a set of justified beliefs, the 
beliefs themselves will typically vary with respect to how vulnerable they are to defeat – as the above 
examples illustrate.  Broadly speaking, the stronger one’s justification for a proposition, the more 
resistant it is to defeat.  The reason that P64, P39, P7 and P90 buckle under the strain of the report is not 
that it weighs extra heavily against them (it doesn’t) – it is because these are the claims that are least 
able to bear the weight.   
Third, according to Praolini, it is ad hoc to maintain that the referee’s report only defeats the 
least justified claims in the book, when a conjunction of other claims in the book may have an even 
lower level of justification.  That is, it would be ad hoc to maintain that the referee’s report defeats 
the least justified claims P64, P39, P7, P90 if a conjunction of further claims – say, P19  P71  P4  P96 – 
was less justified still.  I am inclined to think that Praolini’s third reply, like the first, effectively begs 
the question against those who would defend Closure.    
Consider the following principle which we might call Comparative Closure:   
One’s justification for believing P1  P2  …  Pn is no weaker than one’s justifications for believing 
each of P1, P2, … , Pn.   
Comparative Closure is a stronger principle than Closure, but the most common motivations for 
accepting the latter would seem to carry over to the former.  This would certainly seem to be so for 
the motivation that I sketched at the outset; if one automatically counts as believing P1  P2  …  Pn 
whenever one believes P1, believes P2, … and believes Pn then this gives us reason to deny, quite 
generally, that one’s epistemic standing with respect to P1  P2  …  Pn could be worse than one’s 
epistemic standing with respect to each of P1, P2, … , Pn.  In any case, defenders of Closure are under 
strong pressure to accept Comparative Closure, which effectively rules out the kind of possibility that 
Praolini envisages. 
To pursue this line of thought a little further, it is also very plausible that my justification for 
P1  P2  …  Pn cannot be any stronger than my justification for the least justified member of {P1, P2, 
…, Pn}.  If we combine this with Comparative Closure, we can derive the following: 
The degree of one’s justification for believing P1  P2  …  Pn is equal to the degree of one’s 
justification for believing the least justified member {P1, P2, …, Pn}.   
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We might call this the Minimum Conjunct Rule.  Using this rule, we could add conjunctions to the 




P76, P12, P82 … P76  P12  P82 
  P19, P71, P4, P96 … P19  P71  P4  P96 
         P50, P31 … P50  P31 
  P64, P39, P7, P90 … P64  P39  P7  P90 
I will return to this in the next section.   
Finally, Praolini points out that, if the referee report defeats the least justified claims in the 
book, and the claims all happened to be equally justified, then they would all be defeated.  This result 
is, indeed, unavoidable – if the propositions in a set are equally justified, then the Principle of 
Differential Defeat and the Principle of Uniform Defeat will make exactly the same predictions.  Such 
a case would, however, be very different from what Praolini initially asks us to imagine.  Suppose I’m 
looking at a row of cereal boxes on a supermarket shelf.  Presumably I’m justified in believing, of each 
box, that it contains cereal.  Suppose I then learn that one of the boxes is empty and has been placed 
on the shelf by mistake.  This appears to be a case in which I learn that one amongst a set of equally 
justified propositions is false.  After all, I have no more reason to think that any one box contains cereal 
than any other – I can’t tell this just by looking.  In this case, though, it is plausible that the new 
evidence would serve to defeat my justification for believing each proposition in the set.  That is, it’s 
plausible that I would no longer be justified in believing, of any one box, that it contains cereal – not 
without picking it up or looking inside.  Even if we find the idea of en masse defeat implausible when 
it comes to Praolini’s original example, we should not assume that this intuition will persist when the 
example has been adjusted in such a way as to ensure that all of the beliefs in question are equally 
justified7. 
In any event, defenders of Closure may have a particular reason for tolerating en masse defeat 
in cases of this kind.  If I have equal justification for each of a series of claims and I learn that exactly 
one of them is false, then the situation that I confront is very similar to that presented by the lottery 
paradox.  Both situations involve a large set of propositions, each of which is very likely to be true but 
one of which is sure to be false.  In both situations, the propositions are on a par, in that any one could 
be the false proposition just as easily as any other.  Indeed, if we wrote each of the claims down on 
 
7 Dutant and Littlejohn’s eye test example may be another case in which one learns that one amongst a set of 
equally justified beliefs is false.  The way that Dutant and Littlejohn describe it, the beliefs that the examinee 
forms about the letters and numbers on the eyecharts are equally sound from her own perspective, and she has 
no reason to regard any one as more doubtful than any other.  If these beliefs are equally justified, the Principle 
of Differential Defeat predicts that they will all be defeated by the optometrist’s revelation.  (Unless the 
optometrist’s words are themselves thought to be open to doubt, in which case the examinee faces a more 
complex epistemic situation akin to Ryan’s third version of the preface paradox discussed in n3.  I return to this 
kind of situation in n16).  It is worth noting that Dutant and Littlejohn’s judge example is quite different in this 
regard.  One could not simply stipulate that the judge’s guilt beliefs are all equally justified without considerably 
altering the case and making it far more contrived than what one would naturally imagine.  In fact, even in the 
eye test example, the stipulation of equal justification may not be altogether natural – see 
https://www.ismp.org/resources/misidentification-alphanumeric-symbols.  Thanks here to Philip Ebert.   
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slips of paper, then there would be one ‘winning ticket’, which featured the one false claim, and a 
multitude of ‘losing tickets’, which featured the true claims.  To believe any particular claim would be 
tantamount to believing, of one particular ticket, that it’s a loser.  For a defender of Closure, 
accustomed to denying that one can justifiably believe, of a single ticket, that it has lost a fair lottery, 
embracing en masse defeat in this situation is, I think, a small step.  I will have a bit more to say about 
these sorts of cases in the final section8.  
In this section I have provided a prima facie motivation for the Principle of Differential Defeat, 
and argued that this principle will allow us to preserve Closure in the face of the hybrid paradox.  It 
remains to be shown that there is a viable theory of justification that will vindicate both Closure and 
the Principle of Differential Defeat.   I turn to this next. 
 
IV THE NORMIC THEORY 
In both the lottery and the preface paradoxes, we are invited to infer that I have justification for 
believing a proposition from the premise that it is highly likely, given my evidence.  In the lottery 
paradox the proposition in question is that ticket #72 has lost, while in the preface paradox the 
proposition in question is that the book contains falsehoods.  The inference is a very tempting one.  
After all, most epistemologists are fallibilists who agree that one can have justification for believing a 
proposition even if one’s evidence doesn’t make it completely certain.  But what else can we require, 
then, except that one’s evidence make the proposition likely?  What else could the evidence do? 
On reflection, I think that there is something else that the evidence might do.  Sometimes our 
evidence in favour of a proposition P is such as to make the falsity of P abnormal in the sense of 
requiring special explanation.  Suppose I wander into a room I’ve never been in before and notice that 
the wall before me appears to be red.  Clearly this evidence makes it very likely that the wall before 
me really is red – but this is not its only effect.  If the wall appears to me to be red, but it isn’t red, then 
there would have to be some explanation as to how this came to be – I’m undergoing a colour 
hallucination, the wall is illuminated by hidden red lights, I’ve suddenly been struck by colour blindness 
etc.  Whatever the case, there has to be more to the story – it can’t ‘just so happen’ that the wall 
appears to me to be red, but isn’t red.   
In contrast, the fact that there are 99 losing tickets and only one winner doesn’t generate the 
need for special explanation in the event that ticket #72 is the winner.  If ticket #72 were to win, then 
I may be surprised and delighted (it is my ticket after all) – but I wouldn’t seek some special explanation 
as to how this could possibly have happened.  Some ticket has to win the lottery and it might just as 
well be ticket #72 as any other.  Although it would be very unlikely, there is a sense in which there 
would be nothing abnormal about this ticket being the winner (Vogel, 1999).   
More controversially, the fact that I’m fallible and that comparably ambitious books have 
always contained falsehoods in the past does not generate the need for a special explanation in the 
 
8 Another kind of situation which might be thought problematic for the Principle of Differential Defeat is one in 
which all of the propositions in a set are equally justified save for one, which has a higher degree of justification 
than the others.  If I learn that some member of the set is false, the Principle of Differential Defeat predicts that 
this one proposition will survive, while the remainder are all defeated.  It might seem odd, though, that I should 
retain justification for believing this proposition alone – particularly if my initial justification for believing it was 
only slightly higher than my justification for believing the others.  This kind of example raises questions about 
the granularity of justification – questions about how finely we can differentiate different levels of justification.  
I will return to this in n13 and n17.   
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event that my book turns out to be falsehood-free.  Once again, if this were the case then I may be 
surprised and delighted – but I wouldn’t demand an explanation as to how this could possibly have 
happened.  Recall that every claim in the book has been thoroughly researched and checked – and it 
could just turn out that my research has delivered the right result every time.  Why shouldn’t it?  
Although it would be very unlikely for every claim in the book to be true there is, once again, a sense 
in which there would be nothing abnormal about this turn of events. 
Sometimes when we describe a situation as ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’ we are simply making a 
claim about frequencies – a normal situation is one that frequently arises, while an abnormal situation 
is one that is infrequent.  If this is our understanding of normalcy, then we should say that it would be 
abnormal for ticket #72 to win or for my book to be error free.  This is not the only way that we use 
these terms however.  If the lights in my house suddenly start to flicker, or my car fails to start when I 
turn my key in the ignition and I remark ‘that’s not normal’, I’m not just pointing out that this is 
something rare or infrequent – part of what I’m saying is precisely that there needs to be some special 
explanation for what is occurring.   
Say that evidence E normically supports a proposition P just in case, given E, the situation in 
which P is false would be abnormal in the sense of requiring special explanation (Smith, 2010, 2016, 
2018).  The evidence that the wall appears to be red normically supports the proposition that the wall 
is red.  The evidence that there are 99 losing tickets and one winning ticket does not normically 
support the proposition that my ticket has lost.  The fact that I’m fallible and that comparable books 
have always turned out to contain falsehoods in the past does not normically support the proposition 
that my book contains a falsehood.   
According to the normic theory of justification, one has justification for believing a proposition 
P just in case one’s evidence normically supports P.  In the lottery paradox, the normic theory predicts 
that I lack justification for believing, of any ticket, that it has lost the lottery – I lack justification for 
believing any of P1, P2, …, P100.  In the preface paradox, the normic theory predicts that I lack 
justification for believing that the book contains a falsehood – I lack justification for believing ~P1  
~P2  …  ~P1009.  Not only does the normic theory offer a way of preserving Closure in the face of the 
lottery and preface paradoxes – it would appear to deliver a general validation of the principle: 
Suppose one has justification for believing P1, justification for believing P2, …, justification for believing 
Pn.  According to the normic theory, given one’s evidence E, there would have to be a special 
explanation if P1 were false and there would have to be a special explanation if P2 were false … and 
there would have to be a special explanation if Pn were false.  What about P1  P2  …  Pn?  If P1  P2 
 …  Pn were false, then at least one of P1, P2, …, Pn would have to be false.  Therefore, given one’s 
evidence E, there would have to be a special explanation if P1  P2  …  Pn were false and, according 
to the normic theory, one has justification for believing P1  P2  …  Pn (Smith, 2018, pp3870).  The 
claim that the normic theory validates Closure will also permit of a more rigorous proof – given a 
certain formal development of the notion of normic support – which I will outline in the next section. 
 
9 In the ‘homogeneous preface paradox’ discussed in n3, we are asked to imagine an author who writes a well-
researched ambitious factual book in which he argues precisely that all well-researched ambitious factual books 
contain falsehoods (Easwaran and Fitelson, 2015, section 3).  Though we are not told precisely how the author 
proceeds, it’s natural to imagine this book as listing a series of well-researched ambitious factual books, along 
with the falsehoods that they have been found to contain.  If that’s right, then it’s clear that this evidence does 
not normically support the conclusion that all well-researched, ambitious factual books contain at least one 
falsehood or that the author’s own book contains at least one falsehood – it doesn’t generate the need for a 
special explanation in the event that the author’s book is falsehood-free.  From the perspective of the normic 
theory, the homogeneous preface paradox presents no greater challenge than the original.   
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The normic theory can be easily extended to justification comparisons.  Say that E normically 
supports proposition P more strongly than proposition Q just in case, given E, the situation in which P 
is false is less normal, in the sense of requiring more explanation, than the situation in which Q is false.  
According to the normic theory, one has more justification for believing P than Q just in case one’s 
evidence normically supports P more strongly than Q.  Given this, it is plausible that the normic theory 
will serve to validate Comparative Closure and the Minimum Conjunct Rule: To explain the falsity of 
P1  P2  …  Pn one must explain either the falsity of P1 or the falsity of P2, … or the falsity of Pn.  Given 
one’s evidence E, the amount of explanation required by the falsity of P1  P2  …  Pn is equal to the 
amount of explanation required by the falsity of P1 or the falsity of P2, … or the falsity of Pn, whichever 
is least.  According to the normic theory, the degree of justification I have for believing P1  P2  …  Pn 
is equal to the degree of justification I have for believing the least justified of P1, P2, …, Pn.  This 
somewhat casual demonstration can, once again, be substituted for a more formal proof, which I will 
detail in the next section. 
Normic support is defeasible.  Just because a given body of evidence provides normic support 
for a proposition, it doesn’t automatically follow that an expanded body of evidence will do so.  
Suppose again that I wander into a room and notice that the wall before me appears to be red.  Given 
that the wall appears to be red, there would have to be a special explanation in the event that the wall 
is not red.  Suppose I then discover that the wall is illuminated by hidden red light such that it would 
appear to be red even if it were white.  Given that the wall appears to be red and is illuminated by 
hidden red light, there would not need to be a special explanation in the event that the wall is not red 
– the new evidence, in effect, removes the need for explanation in this case.  If E normically supports 
P, we can say that D defeats the normic support for P just in case E  D does not normically support 
P.         
 We can now pose the following question: Suppose a body of evidence E provides normic 
support for each proposition in a set {P1, P2, …, Pn}.  What does E  (~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn) normically 
support?  That is, what is the defeating effect of learning ~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn?  If the normic theory is 
to deliver the Principle of Differential Defeat, then learning ~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn must defeat the normic 
support for all and only those propositions in {P1, P2, …, Pn} that were the least normically supported 
by E.  It is far from obvious, however, that this is so.  On the contrary, one might think that learning 
~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn should serve to defeat the normic support for all of the propositions in {P1, P2, …, 
Pn} (giving us instead the Principle of Uniform Defeat) as it would remove the need to explain the 
falsity of any one of P1, P2, …, Pn.  In the next section, I will argue that this hasty reasoning is mistaken.  
In order to do so, we will need to start thinking about normic support in a more formal way.  
 
V NORMAL WORLDS 
Suppose propositions can be ordered according to their normalcy – according to how much 
explanation their truth would require.  Normic support can be analysed in terms of comparative 
normalcy relations amongst propositions: E normically supports P just in case E  P is more normal 
than E  ~P, and E normically supports P more strongly than Q just in case E  ~Q is more normal than 
E  ~P.  Given these definitions, the formal features of normic support will be determined by the 
formal features of the normalcy ordering of propositions.  
 Consider a set of propositions F, which is partially ordered by entailment, closed under 
disjunction and negation and which contains a ‘maximal’ proposition which is entailed by all 
propositions in the set and a ‘minimal’ proposition which entails all propositions in the set.  The 
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maximal proposition can be thought of as a tautology or logical truth and the minimal proposition as 
a contradiction or logical falsehood.  If the set of propositions F is infinite, we suppose also that it is 
closed under infinite disjunction.  I assume that all propositions in F can be compared for their 
normalcy – for any two propositions, either one is more normal than the other or they are equally 
normal.  That is, I assume that, for any two propositions in F, either the truth of one requires more 
explanation than the truth of the other, or their truth requires the same amount of explanation.   
The maximal proposition should count as maximally normal and the minimal proposition as 
maximally abnormal.  The truth of a tautology never requires explanation, and nothing could require 
more explanation than the truth of a contradiction.  A disjunction will be as normal as its most normal 
disjunct.  The only way in which P  Q can be true is if either P is true or Q is true.  To explain the truth 
of P  Q is to explain either the truth of P or the truth of Q, and the amount of explanation demanded 
by P  Q will be equal to the amount demanded by P or by Q, whichever is less.   
If we are considering an infinite F, I also assume that there are no infinite ascending chains of 
increasingly normal propositions.  In this case, any set of propositions will be guaranteed to have 
maximally normal members and we can extend the above principle to infinite disjunctions – the 
disjunction of any (potentially infinite) set of propositions is as normal as its most normal members.  
With this assumption in place it will be possible to rank propositions according to how normal they 
are: The rank 1 propositions will be the most normal ones in F.  Once these are removed, the rank 2 
propositions will be the most normal ones amongst those that remain, and so on.  The least normal 
propositions in F – those that are just as abnormal as the minimal proposition – might be assigned an 
infinite rank10.   
 Given a few further assumptions, a proposition P can be modelled as a set of possible worlds 
– namely, the set of possible worlds at which P is true.  In this case, F will be modelled by the subsets 
of a set of possible worlds W, with W itself serving as the maximal proposition and the empty set  
serving as the minimal proposition11.  Disjunction will be modelled as set theoretic union and negation 
will be modelled as complementation in W.  Given a normalcy ranking of propositions, we can derive 
a normalcy ranking of worlds:  Let the normalcy rank of a world w be equal to the normalcy rank of 
the least normal proposition of which it is a member.  That is, let the normalcy rank of w be equal to 
the normalcy rank of the least normal proposition that is true at w.  The rank 1 worlds will be those 
that are members of only rank 1 propositions.  The rank 2 worlds will be those that are members of 
only rank 1 and rank 2 propositions, and so on.  Given this definition, as can be checked, the rank of a 
 
10 If F is infinite, there may be propositions which are not the maximally normal members of any set reached 
after a finite number of steps.  In this case, the most normal members of F, once all propositions with finite 
ranks have been removed, might be assigned, as their rank, the first transfinite ordinal .  At this point, the 
process can begin anew; once these propositions are removed, the most normal amongst the remainder can be 
assigned rank  + 1 and so on.  There may still be propositions that are not the maximally normal members of 
any set reached by a finite number of such further steps, in which case we can assign propositions to the rank 
.2.  In this way, we can reach further limit ordinal ranks –, .3 … 2… 3 … and we could consider uncountable 
ordinal ranks as well, if F is taken to be uncountably large.  Though the formalism allows for transfinite normalcy 
ranks, it is unclear whether they can be made intelligible by the informal interpretation of normalcy in terms of 
the need for explanation.  In any event, in the main text I restrict attention to cases in which all propositions can 
be assigned either a finite normalcy rank, or the single infinite rank representing maximal abnormality.  
11 If F is finite, it is guaranteed to be isomorphic to the power set of a set W.  If F is infinite then, in addition to 
the assumptions already tabled, we must assume that it contains atoms – propositions which are distinct from 
the minimal proposition and entailed only by the minimal proposition and by themselves – and that every 
proposition, save the minimal proposition, is entailed by some atom.  
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proposition must be equal to the rank of the most normal worlds within it – the rank of the most 
normal worlds at which it is true12.  
E normically supports P just in case E  P is more normal than E  ~P.  This is just to say that 
the most normal E  P-worlds are more normal than the most normal E  ~P-worlds or, more simply, 
that P is true at the most normal E-worlds.  Normic support can, then, be analysed in terms of variably 
strict quantification over possible worlds: E normically supports P just in case P is true at all of the 
most normal worlds at which E is true.  Imagine the worlds at which E is true as points arrayed in space 
with proximity to a central point serving as a metaphor for normalcy.  We can visualise worlds 
arranged in a series of concentric spheres radiating from that central point, as in figure 1 below:  
 
The innermost sphere represents the E-worlds that are most normal, the next sphere incorporates the 
E-worlds that rank next in terms of normalcy and so on.  The diagram depicts a situation in which E 
provides normic support for P2 but fails to provide normic support for P1.   
This analysis of normic support offers a new perspective on Closure and the normic theory.  If 
E normically supports each proposition in the set {P1, P2, …, Pn} then E normically supports P1  P2  … 
 Pn.  Proof Suppose E normically supports each proposition in the set {P1, P2, …, Pn}.  In this case, P1 is 
true in all of the most normal E-worlds and P2 is true in all of the most normal E-worlds … and Pn is 
true in all of the most normal E-worlds.  It follows immediately that P1  P2  …  Pn is true in all of the 
most normal E-worlds in which case E normically supports P1  P2  …  Pn. QED  The normic theory 
of justification validates Closure.   
 
12 Once propositions are modelled as sets of possible worlds, the assumption that there cannot be infinite 
ascending chains of increasingly normal propositions is equivalent to the assumption that any set of worlds must 
have maximally normal members.  David Lewis (1973, section 1.4) famously considers and rejects a 
corresponding assumption for world similarity – which he terms the ‘limit assumption’ – though his reasons 
don’t straightforwardly carry over to the case of world normalcy.  Without this assumption, neither propositions 
nor worlds could be assigned numerical normalcy ranks – but we would retain the capacity to make normalcy 
comparisons.  This looser framework would in fact still suffice for the core aims of this section – namely, to 
establish that the normic theory of justification will deliver both Closure and the Principle of Differential Defeat 
– but the details are omitted here.  For further discussion of these issues, see Smith (2016, chap. 8). 
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E normically supports P more strongly than Q just in case E  ~Q is more normal than E  ~P.  
This is just to say that the most normal E  ~Q-worlds are more normal than the most normal E  ~P-
worlds.  If figure 2 represents, once again, the normalcy ranking of E-worlds, it depicts a situation in 
which E provides normic support for each of P1, P2 and P3, but stronger normic support for P3 than P2 
and stronger normic support for P2 than P1.  The most normal E-worlds in which P1 is false are in the 
second sphere, the most normal E-worlds in which P2 is false are in the third sphere and the most 
normal E-worlds in which P3 is false are in the fourth sphere.  
 
We might define the degree to which E normically supports a proposition P as the number of normalcy 
spheres of E-worlds throughout which P holds.  Given this definition, E normically supports P more 
strongly than Q just in case it normically supports P to a higher degree than Q.  In the above diagram, 
E normically supports P1 to degree 1, P2 to degree 2 and P3 to degree 313. 
The degree to which E normically supports a conjunction P1  P2  …  Pn is no lower than the 
degree to which it supports each of P1, P2, …, Pn.  Proof Any world in which P1  P2  …  Pn is false is a 
world at which either P1 is false or P2 is false … or Pn is false.  Let w be one of the most normal worlds 
 
13 According to the normic theory (when formally developed in the way suggested here) degrees of justification, 
unlike of degrees of probability, are discrete.  While the probability of two propositions can be brought arbitrarily 
close, while one remains more probable than the other, two propositions that differ in their degree of 
justification must be at least a whole step apart.  This has some relevance for the kind of situation imagined in 
n8, in which one has equal justification for every proposition in a set apart from a single proposition for which 
one’s justification is ‘slightly’ higher.  If one learns that some proposition in the set is false then, according to the 
Principle of Differential Defeat, all of the propositions in the set will be defeated, aside from the one proposition 
that is more justified than the others.  But what if even a single degree of justification always represents a 
substantial difference?  The formal framework developed here is compatible with there being a limited number 
of possible degrees that justification could have.  And, even if an infinite number of degrees is permitted, the 
framework can still be construed in such a way that every degree indicates a significant shift from its 
predecessor.  These points may allay (though perhaps not altogether answer) our concerns over what the 
Principle of Differential Defeat predicts in a case like this. 
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at which E is true and P1  P2  …  Pn is false.  There must be some Px  {P1, P2, …, Pn} such that Px is 
false at w.  It follows that the degree to which E normically supports P1  P2  …  Pn is no lower than 
the degree to which it normically supports Px. QED The normic theory of justification validates 
Comparative Closure.  As can be easily checked, if Px  {P1, P2, …, Pn} is false at some of the most 
normal worlds in which E is true and P1  P2  …  Pn is false, then the degree to which E normically 
supports P1  P2  …  Pn will in fact be equal to the degree to which E normically supports Px and, 
more generally, equal to the degree to which E supports the least supported members of {P1, P2, …, 
Pn}.  As a result, the normic theory of justification validates the Minimum Conjunct Rule14.  
If E normically supports P, D defeats this normic support just in case E  D does not normically 
support P.  In this case, while P is true in all of the most normal E-worlds, P is false in some of the most 
normal E  D-worlds.  D, in effect, forces us further from the most normal worlds in which E is true, 
and into a region in which the connection between E and P is disrupted.  If the following diagram, once 
again, represents the normalcy ranking of E-worlds, it depicts a situation in which E provides normic 
support for P that is defeated by D.  With evidence E, I have normic support for all and only those 
propositions that contain the red region – including P.  Once I learn D, I then have normic support for 
all and only those propositions that contain the yellow region15. 
 
14 The Minimum Conjunct Rule corresponds to one of the axioms for a positive ranking function (Spohn, 2009, 
section 2.1, 2012, section 5.2).  A function r taking propositions in F into the set of natural numbers plus infinity 
will qualify as a positive ranking function just in case: 
(1) r(W) =  
(2) r() = 0 
(3) r(P  Q) = min{r(P), r(Q)} 
In case F is infinite, (3) may be strengthened to: 
 (4) For any set of propositions , r() = min{r(P) | P  } 
A positive ranking function that satisfies (4) is referred to as ‘completely minimative’.  The degrees of normic 
support conferred upon propositions by a body of evidence will conform to these axioms (Smith, 2016, chap. 8, 
2018, section 4).  If, as discussed in n10, we assign propositions to transfinite ordinal normalcy ranks, degrees of 
normic support should also be capable of taking such values.  In this case, the above axioms can stand, with  
interpreted as a kind of ‘absolute infinity’ greater than an ordinal, giving us something close to Spohn’s 
conditional ordinal functions (Spohn, 2012, pp72-73). 
15 There is a clear connection between the effect of defeat, according to the normic theory, and the effect of 
adding conflicting information to a belief set, according to belief revision theory.  On Grove’s possible worlds 
model of AGM belief revision theory, a belief set is represented by a set of possible worlds – the worlds at which 
all of the beliefs in the set are true – and is associated with a system of spheres which orders the remaining 
worlds with respect to their ‘closeness’ to that belief set.  If, in figure 3, we interpret the spheres as representing 
closeness to the belief set B represented by the red region then, on Grove’s model, the yellow region will 
represent the new belief set that results from the addition of D to B (see Grove, 1988, section 2, partic. pp162).  





This diagram depicts a situation in which D defeats E’s normic support for P. 
Consider now the following technicolour version of figure 2:   
 
Before I acquire any defeating information, I have normic support for all and only those propositions 
that contain the red region – a set which includes P1, P2 and P3.  If I learn ~P1  ~P2  ~P3, the most 
normal worlds that are compatible with my expanded evidence will be those in the yellow region, and 
I will have normic support for all and only those propositions that contain this region – a set which no 
longer includes P1, but continues to include P2 and P3.  If I learn ~P2  ~P3, the most normal worlds 
compatible with my further expanded evidence will be those in the purple region, and I will have 
normic support for all and only those propositions that contain this region – a set which no longer 
includes P2, but still includes P3.   
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When I learn ~P1  ~P2  ~P3 this serves to defeat my normic support for the least normically 
supported of the three propositions – P1.  When I learn ~P2  ~P3 this serves to defeat my normic 
support for the least normically supported of the two remaining propositions – P2.  Suppose my 
evidence E provides normic support for each proposition in the set {P1, P2, …, Pn} and suppose I learn 
~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn.  We prove in two stages the general claim that this serves to defeat the normic 
support for all and only those propositions in {P1, P2, …, Pn} that are least normically supported by E.   
First, for any proposition Px  {P1, P2, …, Pn} if there is another proposition in {P1, P2, …, Pn} that is less 
normically supported by E, then ~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn does not defeat the normic support for Px.  Proof  
Suppose Px  {P1, P2, …, Pn} and there exists another proposition Py  {P1, P2, …, Pn} that is less 
normically supported than Px by evidence E.  In this case, there is a world in which E is true and Py is 
false which is more normal than the most normal worlds in which E is true and Px is false.  Since Py  
{P1, P2, …, Pn}, there is a world in which E and ~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn are true which is more normal than 
the most normal worlds in which E is true and Px is false.  Ipso facto, Px is true in the most normal 
worlds in which E and ~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn are true and E  (~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn) normically supports 
Px. QED 
We can also prove the converse claim: For any proposition Px  {P1, P2, …, Pn} if there is no 
other proposition in {P1, P2, …, Pn} that is less normically supported by E then ~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn does 
defeat the normic support for Px.  Proof Suppose Px  {P1, P2, …, Pn} and there exists no other 
proposition in {P1, P2, …, Pn} that is less normically supported than Px by evidence E.  In this case there 
are no worlds at which E and ~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn are true and which are more normal than the most 
normal worlds at which E is true and Px is false.  Ipso facto, Px is false at some of the most normal 
worlds at which E and ~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn are true and E  (~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn) does not normically 
support Px.  QED 
If one’s evidence E provides normic support for each proposition in the set {P1, P2, …, Pn} then 
~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn defeats the normic support for all and only those propositions in {P1, P2, …, Pn} 
which were the least normically supported by E.  According to the normic theory of justification, if one 
has justification for each proposition in the set {P1, P2, …, Pn} and one learns ~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn, this 
new evidence serves to defeat all and only those propositions in {P1, P2, …, Pn} that were the least 
justified by E.  The normic theory of justification delivers the Principle of Differential Defeat.  In the 
hybrid paradox, the normic theory predicts that, when I learn that the book contains an error – when 
I learn ~P1  ~P2  …  ~P100 – this will serve to defeat all and only those claims in the book that were 
the least justified – the least justified members of {P1, P2, …, P100}16.  
 
16 What if one receives only a defeasible report to the effect that ~P1  ~P2  …  ~P100 as in Ryan’s third version 
of the preface paradox discussed in n3?  Such cases are more complex, and I provide only a preliminary 
treatment here: Suppose one has evidence E that normically supports a proposition P and acquires evidence F 
that normically supports ~P.  Given certain conditions, this new evidence will defeat one’s normic support for P 
just in case the degree to which F normically supports ~P is greater than or equal to the degree to which E 
normically supports P.  The conditions in question are that E and F be equally normal propositions and that F 
hold in some of the most normal worlds in which E and ~P hold and E hold in some of the most normal worlds 
in which F and P hold.  What this ensures, in a way, is that there is no extraneous normic interaction between E 
and F beyond that which is mandated by their levels of respective normic support for the conflicting propositions 
P and ~P.  
Ryan’s third version of the preface paradox arguably fits this pattern, with one’s prior evidence 
normically supporting P1  P2  …  P100, and the report normically supporting ~P1  ~P2  …  ~P100.  As 
mentioned in n3, Ryan suggests that, if one has evidence that justifies every claim in the book, one would not 
be justified in believing the report and ought to dismiss it.  According to the normic theory, this diagnosis may 
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 When accommodating new evidence, according to the normic theory, one is only required to 
take seriously the most normal ways in which the new evidence could be true, given one’s prior 
evidence.  The result proved is, in effect, a special case of this more general principle.  When one 
learns ~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn one is obliged to take seriously only those disjuncts that would be the most 
normal, given the existing evidence.  That is just to say that one is obliged to take seriously only the 
falsity of those members of {P1, P2, …, Pn} for which the existing evidence provides the least normic 
support.  
The Principle of Differential Defeat is also an instance of another more general principle, 
validated by the normic theory, regarding the effect of learning ~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn upon the degree 
of justification enjoyed by each proposition in {P1, P2, …, Pn}.  The degree to which a proposition Px  
{P1, P2, …, Pn} is normically supported by evidence E is equal to the number of spheres of E-worlds 
throughout which Px holds.  The degree to which a proposition Px  {P1, P2, …, Pn} is normically 
supported by E  (~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn) is equal to the number of spheres of E  (~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn)-
worlds throughout which Px holds.  If m is the degree to which E normically supports the least 
normically supported propositions in {P1, P2, …, Pn} then m is the number of spheres of E-worlds 
throughout which P1  P2  …  Pn is true, and the number of spheres that disappear when we move 
from evidence E to evidence E  (~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn).  In this case, the effect of learning ~P1  ~P2  
…  ~Pn is to lower the degree of normic support for each proposition in {P1, P2, …, Pn} by m.  According 
to the normic theory of justification, learning that one member of a set of justified propositions is false 
will uniformly lower the degree of justification for each proposition in the set.  In one sense, the new 
evidence serves to ‘partially defeat’ the justification for each proposition, but will only (completely) 
defeat – that is, lower to 0 – the justification for those propositions which were the least justified to 
begin with.  It is only these propositions that, as it were, completely buckle under the weight of the 
new evidence17. 
 As well as validating Closure and offering viable Closure-preserving solutions to the lottery 
and preface paradoxes, the normic theory of justification validates the Principle of Differential Defeat 
and offers a viable Closure-preserving solution to the hybrid paradox.  While this completes the 
primary aim of the paper, in the final section I turn briefly to a related topic, which also stems from 
the work of Marvin Backes (2019b); an objection to the normic theory of justification which focusses 





be correct provided that the degree to which the report provides justification for ~P1  ~P2  …  ~P100 is lower 
than the degree to which one’s prior evidence provides justification for the least justified of {P1, P2, …, P100}.  
Otherwise, the report will succeed in defeating one’s justification for some of the claims in the book. 
17 Consider again the situation described in n8 and n13 in which one has equal justification for believing each of 
a series of propositions P1…Pn, and ‘slightly’ more justification for believing a further proposition Pn+1.  If one 
learns ~P1  ~P2  …  ~Pn+1 then, as discussed, the normic theory will predict that one will lose justification for 
believing each of P1…Pn, but will retain justification for believing Pn+1.  In light of the observation made in the 
main text, however, the normic theory will also predict that the new information will not affect the difference 
in one’s degree of justification for P1…Pn and for Pn+1.  Thus, if one’s initial justification for P1…Pn were just one 
degree lower than one’s justification for Pn+1 then, while the latter justification won’t be defeated by the new 
information, it will be subject to partial defeat which reduces its degree of justification to 1.  For more on partial 
defeat and the normic theory see Smith (2016, section 8.3)  
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VI THE PROBLEM OF ‘EASY DEFEAT’ 
Suppose Helen has a peanut allergy.  One day she goes into a café and orders a brownie that is labelled 
‘peanut free’.  Helen believes that the brownie is peanut free, and this proposition is normically 
supported by her evidence.  Suppose Helen then reads in the newspaper that a flour supplier has just 
announced that a bag of peanut-contaminated flour mistakenly made it into circulation.  According to 
Backes (2019b), this will serve to defeat the normic support for Helen’s belief because it provides a 
possible explanation as to how the brownie might contain traces of peanut, in spite of the label.  If 
this is right, then the normic theory predicts that, once Helen reads the newspaper report, she is no 
longer justified in believing that the brownie is peanut free.  Backes claims that this is a 
counterintuitive result – after all, it is extremely unlikely that any of the contaminated flour would 
have made its way into Helen’s brownie.  Backes goes on to outline several further cases of ‘easy 
defeat’, in which the normic theory allegedly makes it too easy for one’s justified beliefs to be 
defeated.  I will consider two more of his cases here: 
Suppose Helen believes that she will see her friend Bob when she travels to Oxfordshire next 
weekend.  Suppose Bob has said that he will meet her and that he is usually very reliable and 
trustworthy and, as a result, her evidence provides normic support for her belief.  Suppose Helen then 
reads in the newspaper that a man in Oxfordshire has been fatally struck by lightning.  According to 
Backes, this serves to defeat the normic support for Helen’s belief, and for a similar reason to the 
preceding case; the new information could offer a possible explanation as to how she could fail to see 
Bob, in spite of her present evidence.  Once again, if this is right then the normic theory predicts that, 
after reading the newspaper, Helen would no longer have justification for believing that she will see 
Bob next weekend. 
Finally, suppose that Helen has, for several years, owned an apartment in New York, when she 
reads in the newspaper that a New York apartment was recently gutted by fire.  Plausibly, Helen would 
still be justified in believing that she has an apartment in New York.  And yet, according to Backes, the 
normic theory predicts otherwise – after all, this report offers a possible explanation as to how she 
could fail to have an apartment, despite her evidence, and thus deprives the belief of normic support.   
 One thing that we might observe right away is that these examples all appear to be somewhat 
similar to the example that drives the hybrid paradox.  In the hybrid paradox, recall, I have secured 
evidence which normically supports each of 100 independent factual claims P1, P2 … P100 and I then 
learn that one of these claims is false – ~P1  ~P2  …  ~P100.  If we focus on one particular claim in 
the book – P57 say – the new evidence might be thought to offer a kind of explanation as to how this 
claim could be false in spite of my existing evidence.  And yet, as we have seen, it is not inevitable that 
the new information will defeat my normic support for P57.  By the result proved in the previous 
section, my normic support for P57 will only be defeated on the assumption that it was one of the least 
normically supported of the 100 claims.    
 In Backes’s examples, Helen doesn’t literally learn that one amongst a set of justified beliefs 
is false – but she does acquire evidence which can be accommodated in a number of different ways, 
some of which may count as more normal, given her existing evidence, than others.  Suppose one’s 
evidence E provides normic support for P and one then learns D.  If there is a proposition Q that entails 
D and which would be more normal, given E, than ~P, then D will not defeat one’s normic support for 
P.  We might say, in this case, that Q insulates P from defeat by D.  Proof Suppose E normically supports 
P and suppose there is a world in which E and Q are true which is more normal than the most normal 
worlds in which E is true and P is false.  Suppose finally that Q entails D.  In this case, there is a world 
in which E and D are true which is more normal than the most normal worlds in which E is true and P 
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is false.  Ipso facto, P is true in the most normal worlds in which E and D are true and E  D normically 
supports P. QED 
Consider again Backes’ apartment example.  On the normic theory, the information that an 
apartment in New York has been gutted by fire will only defeat Helen’s justification for believing that 
she has an apartment in New York on the assumption that it would be just as normal, given her 
evidence, for her apartment to be gutted by fire as any other.  But we have no reason to accept this – 
and it would take little to make it false.  There are many factors that determine an apartment’s 
vulnerability to fire.  Some apartments are fitted with smoke alarms and sprinkler systems while others 
will lack them.  Some apartments will have old, deteriorated electrical wiring, while others will have 
new wiring that has passed rigorous safety checks.  Some apartments will have open fireplaces, while 
others won’t, and so on.  For any apartment to be gutted by fire may require explanation, but more 
explanation is required in the case of some apartments than others. 
It would be natural to suppose that Helen is aware that her apartment has certain fire safety 
measures that are not present in every apartment in New York.  While this evidence does leave open 
the possibility that Helen’s apartment is the one that burned, it generates the need for further 
explanation in this case.  Upon reading that a New York apartment has been gutted by fire, it would 
be natural for Helen to reassure herself with the thought that she has fire safety measures in place – 
a sprinkler system, wiring that has undergone safety checks etc.  In this case, there is a proposition 
that insulates Helen’s belief from defeat – the proposition that there is an apartment in New York that 
lacks appropriate fire safety measures and was recently gutted by fire.  It would be more normal, given 
Helen’s evidence, for this proposition to be true than for her belief to be false.  
 Similar remarks may apply to the Bob example (though matters are admittedly less clear-cut).  
Upon reading that a man in Oxfordshire has been fatally struck by lightning, it would be natural for 
Helen to reassure herself with the thought that Bob is relatively safety conscious and not the sort of 
person who would venture outside during a thunderstorm etc.  The proposition that someone in 
Oxfordshire, more reckless than Bob, has been fatally struck by lightning would plausibly insulate 
Helen’s belief from defeat.  Once again, it would be more normal, given Helen’s evidence, for this 
proposition to be true than for her belief to be false. 
  We could, of course, adjust these examples in such a way that there is no proposition that 
will insulate Helen’s beliefs from defeat.  We could stipulate that, given Helen’s evidence, one of the 
most normal ways in which the fire report could be true is for her own apartment to have burned, and 
one of the most normal ways in which the lightning report could be true is for Bob to have been struck.  
Perhaps Helen knows that her apartment is highly vulnerable to fire – perhaps she has reason to 
believe that it is amongst the most vulnerable in New York.  Perhaps Helen knows that Bob is well and 
truly reckless enough to venture out during a thunderstorm – perhaps she has reason to believe that 
he is amongst the most reckless, in this regard, in all of Oxfordshire.  In this case, the normic theory 
would predict, as Backes claims, that the justification for Helen’s beliefs is indeed defeated by the 
reports – but such a prediction is not obviously wrong.   
With the examples fleshed out in this way, there is no available thought with which Helen 
could reassure herself – she would be forced to concede that her apartment is one of those that could 
most easily have burned, and that Bob is one of those who could most easily have been struck.  Such 
realisations would sit very uneasily alongside the beliefs that she has an apartment in New York and 
that she will be meeting Bob next weekend, if she persists in holding them.  Consider the tension 
involved in uttering ‘Someone in Oxfordshire has been fatally struck by lightning and, knowing Bob, it 
could just as easily have been him as anyone else, but I’ll be meeting Bob next weekend’.  In such a 
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case, it’s natural to think that Helen ought to fall back upon a probabilistic belief – it’s very likely that 
she’ll be meeting Bob next weekend or some such – until she has had an opportunity to gather more 
information, by contacting Bob or reading more details in the paper etc.   
The problem with these two examples – a hazard of thought experiments more generally – is 
that the predictions and the intuitions that are supposedly being compared both turn, in part, upon 
details that are not explicitly supplied.  In each example, Helen will have further background evidence 
that is potentially relevant to her belief, and to the interpretation of the new information that she 
receives.  In each case, the kind of background evidence that we would naturally assume to be at 
Helen’s disposal will be enough to ensure that the normic support for her belief is insulated and is not 
defeated by this new information.      
This leaves only Backes’s first example.  In this case, I am inclined to think that the normic 
support for Helen’s belief genuinely is defeated.  When Helen reads about the bag of peanut-
contaminated flour, she learns is that, in all likelihood, some small proportion of baked goods in the 
city will contain this flour.  Given her limited evidence, it would be just as normal for the brownie 
before her to be part of this group as any other baked good in the city.  Backes claims that Helen 
should still be justified in believing that her brownie is peanut free – but is this really so clear?  After 
reading the report, it would be understandable if Helen decided not to eat the brownie.  And, if Helen 
did go ahead and eat the brownie as planned, there is some temptation to see this as a rash decision 
– particularly if her allergy is severe.  It would also be irresponsible for Helen to assert that the brownie 
is peanut free or to offer some to a friend who also has a peanut allergy.  Helen’s new evidence does, 
then, make a significant difference as to how she ought to behave – no longer should she blithely act 
as though the brownie is peanut-free.  A natural explanation for this is that Helen’s new evidence also 
makes a difference as to what she should believe – she should no longer believe that the brownie is 
peanut free.   
Backes describes Helen’s new information as ‘negligible’ (pp2885) – but many, I suspect, 
would be inclined to take such information very seriously.  If the café owners were made aware of the 
report, one could easily imagine them strongly advising Helen not to eat the brownie – offering her a 
refund or an exchange for a flour-free item.  In real food contamination or tampering scares, the 
proportion of products affected is typically very small – but the measures taken are often drastic, 
including mass product recalls and dire public health warnings18.   
In any case, it is not just the normic theorist who must accept that the justification for Helen’s 
belief is defeated in this case – any defender of Closure is committed to this.  Suppose that Helen were 
still justified in believing that her brownie is peanut free, and contains no peanut-contaminated flour.  
Helen should also be justified in believing that the brownie sitting unpurchased on the shelf does not 
contain peanut-contaminated flour, and believing the same about the blueberry muffin next to it and 
the cinnamon swirl at the café across the street and so on.  If Helen encountered every baked good in 
the city, she could justifiably believe, of each one, that it does not contain peanut-contaminated flour.  
Given Closure, Helen would be justified in believing that none of the baked goods in the city contains 
 
18 In September 2018, the discovery of sewing needles concealed in supermarket strawberries triggered a 
nationwide panic in Australia.  In a reaction that is very typical of such cases, strawberries were withdrawn from 
supermarket shelves and consumers were strongly advised to dispose of or return any strawberries purchased.  
At the time of the initial reaction, only a few affected strawberries had been discovered, out of the millions 






peanut contaminated flour.  Given the newspaper report, it is clear that she does not have justification 
for believing this.   
 
VII CONCLUSION 
This paper has, in one way, been an extended exercise in exploring the consequences of preserving 
the Closure principle for justification.  The lottery and the preface paradoxes both highlight certain 
commitments that any defender of Closure must be prepared to undertake – and so it is with the new 
hybrid paradox described by Praolini and Backes.  I have argued that the primary lesson of the new 
paradox is that a Closure defender is under significant pressure to accept what I have called the 
Principle of Differential Defeat.  The formal framework that I have set out demonstrates one way in 
which this principle could be embedded within a broad and systematic approach to epistemic 
justification – an approach which brings a range of further principles, such as Comparative Closure and 
the Minimum Conjunct Rule, as well as principles regarding partial defeat and insulation.  For a Closure 
denier, the new paradox represents a powerful addition to one’s arsenal.  For a Closure defender, the 
paradox is valuable in another way – for revealing more of the rich network of principles of which 
Closure is but one part.     
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